	STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
	PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
November 21, Concord, New	<b>2006</b> - 9:25 a.m. Hampshire
RE:	DE 06-125 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: Proposed Default Energy Services and Default Energy Service Rate.
PRESENT :	Chairman Thomas B. Getz, Presiding Commissioner Graham J. Morrison Commissioner Clifton C. Below Christine True, Clerk
APPEARANCES :	
	<b>Reptg. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.:</b> Steven V. Camerino, Esg.
	<b>Reptg. Residential Ratepayers:</b> Meredith Hatfield, Esq., Consumer Advocate Office of Consumer Advocate
	<b>Reptg. PUC Staff:</b> Suzanne G. Amidon, Esq.
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Co	urt Reporter: Steven E. Patnaude, CCR

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ORIGINAL

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6		Stephen R. Hall (09-08-06)	
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Then, we will open the 3 hearing in docket DE 06-125. On September 8, 2006, Public Service Company of New Hampshire filed with the Commission 4 5 a petition to establish its Default Energy Service rates 6 for bills rendered on or after January 1, 2007. And, an 7 order of notice was issued on September 20, setting a 8 hearing -- a prehearing conference for October 5. And, 9 subsequent to that, a secretarial letter was issued 10 approving a procedural schedule setting a hearing for this morning. And, we have a revised filing that was submitted 11 12 by Public Service Company of New Hampshire on November 17. 13 Can we take appearances please. 14 MR. EATON: For Public Service Company 15 of New Hampshire, my name is Gerald M. Eaton. Good 16 morning. 17 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Good morning. 18 MR. CAMERINO: Good morning, 19 Commissioners. Steve Camerino, from McLane, Graf, 20 Raulerson & Middleton, on behalf of Constellation 21 NewEnergy, Inc. 22 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Good morning. 23 CMSR. MORRISON: Good morning. 24 CMSR. BELOW: Good morning.

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1	MS. HATFIELD: Good morning. Meredith
2	Hatfield, for the Office of Consumer Advocate, and with me
3	today is Ken Traum, Assistant Consumer Advocate.
4	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Good morning.
5	CMSR. MORRISON: Good morning.
6	CMSR. BELOW: Good morning.
7	MS. AMIDON: Good morning. Suzanne
8	Amidon, for the Commission Staff. And, with me today is
9	Steve Mullen, who is a Utility Analyst with the Electric
10	Division.
11	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Well, good morning.
12	And, I'll note as well that there was direct testimony
13	filed by Mr. Traum on November 7. Mr. Eaton, are you
14	prepared to go forward with your witness?
15	MR. EATON: Yes. I'd like to call a
16	panel of witnesses, Stan Puzio, Steve Hall, and Rick
17	Labrecque Richard Labrecque.
18	(Whereupon Stan Puzio, Stephen R. Hall
19	and Richard C. Labrecque was duly sworn
20	and cautioned by the Court Reporter.)
21	STAN PUZIO, SWORN
22	STEPHEN R. HALL, SWORN
23	RICHARD C. LABRECQUE, SWORN
24	DIRECT EXAMINATION

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

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BY MR. EATON: 1 Mr. Puzio, would you please state your name for the 2 0 3 record. (Puzio) Stan Puzio. 4 А 5 0 For whom are you employed? (Puzio) Northeast Utilities. 6 А What is your position and what are your duties? 7 0 (Puzio) I'm Manager of Revenue Regulation and Load 8 А Resources. My current responsibilities include all 9 revenue requirements issues associated with Public 10 Service of New Hampshire and other regulatory issues 11 with CL&P, Western Mass. Electric Company, and Yankee 12 Gas. 13 Do you work on matters involving Public Service 14 Q Company of New Hampshire? 15 (Puzio) Yes. 16 А And, how long have you been involved with those 17 0 18 matters? (Puzio) Over twelve years. 19 А What is your educational background? 20 0 21 (Puzio) I have a Bachelor's of Science degree in Α Accounting from Central Connecticut State University 22 and a Master's of Science degree from Rensselaer 23 24 Polytechnic Institute.

[Witness panel: Puzio|Hall|Labrecque]

1 Q Mr. Puzio, have you ever testified before this 2 Commission? 3 А (Puzio) Yes, I did, earlier this morning, in docket 4 DE 06-134. 5 0 Now, I place in front of you a document with a date 6 of September 8th, 2006. I wonder if you could 7 identify that please. 8 А (Puzio) Yes. This is the proposed Default Energy 9 Service rate that was filed on September 8. 10 Q In that document is a -- is the prefiled testimony of 11 a Robert A. Baumann. Do you recognize that? 12 А (Puzio) Yes, I do. 13 0 Did you assist in the preparation of that testimony? 14 Α (Puzio) I did. 15 Q Is it true and accurate to the best of your knowledge 16 and belief? 17 А (Puzio) Yes, it is. 18 Q And, do you have any corrections to make to that 19 testimony? 20 (Puzio) I have none. А 21 Do you adopt it as your own sworn testimony today? Q 22 (Puzio) Yes. А 23 Mr. Hall, could you please identify yourself for the 0 24 record.

[Witness panel: Puzio|Hall|Labrecque]

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

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1	А	(Hall) My name is Stephen R. Hall.
2	Q	What is your position and for whom are you employed?
3	А	(Hall) I'm Rate and Regulatory Services Manager for
4		PSNH.
5	Q	What is your duties in that position?
6	А	(Hall) I'm responsible for regulatory interface for
7		pricing and for tariff and rate administration.
8	Q	Have you ever testified before this Commission?
9	А	(Hall) Yes, I have.
10	Q	Did you prepare testimony in this proceeding?
11	A	(Hall) Yes, I did.
12	Q	Is it part of that same package that Mr. Puzio
13		identified?
14	A	(Hall) Yes, it is.
15	Q	And, what was the purpose of your testimony?
16	A	(Hall) The purpose of my testimony was to present an
17		anti-gaming mechanism proposal, as required by the
18		Commission in their order in docket DE 05-164.
19		MR. EATON: Mr. Chairman, I ask for your
20	dire	ection, if you would like this whole package to be
21	mark	ed as "Exhibit 1" or would you like the two separate
22	test	imonies, the Baumann/Puzio testimony identified as
23	"Exh	ibit 1" and the Hall testimony identified as "Exhibit
24	2"?	

1		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Let's mark the entire
2	pack	age as 'Exhibit 1".
3		(The document, as described, was
4		herewith marked as <b>Exhibit 1</b> for
5		identification.)
6	BY MR.	EATON:
7	Q	Mr. Labrecque, could you please state your name for
8		the record.
9	А	(Labrecque) Richard Labrecque.
10	Q	For whom are you employed and what is your position?
11	A	(Labrecque) I work at Northeast Utilities. I'm a
12		Principal Engineer in the Wholesale Power Contracts
13		Department.
14	Q	And, what are your duties in that position?
15	A	(Labrecque) To provide support for the various
16		wholesale power procurements that Northeast Utilities
17	1	performs, including the procurement of supplemental
18		energy and capacity for PSNH.
19	Q	Have you previously testified before this Commission?
20	A	(Labrecque) Yes.
21	Q	Did you assist in the preparation of the information
22	l	that supports the proposed Default Service Energy
23		Service rate for 2007?
24	A	(Labrecque) Yes.

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

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1	Q	And, what was your involvement?
2	A	(Labrecque) The energy simulation, the forecasting of
3		expenses for the various supply resources we use to
4		serve Energy Service.
5	Q	Did you file prefiled written testimony?
6	A	(Labrecque) I believe I filed a tech statement with
7		co-sponsored by Mr. Baumann.
8	Q	Do you have in front of you a document that is dated
9		November 17th, 2006?
10	A	(Labrecque) Yes.
11	Q	And, could you identify that document?
12	A	(Labrecque) It's toward the back, it starts it's
13		the final three pages of that document, titled
14		"Technical Statement of Richard C. Labrecque and
15		Robert A. Baumann".
16	Q	And, did you assist in the preparation of that
17		technical statement?
18	A	(Labrecque) Yes.
19	Q	And, the entire document, what does that propose?
20	А	(Labrecque) It explains the changes in the forecasted
21		energy expense between the draft filing in September
22		and this final filing today.
23	Q	And, Mr. Puzio, could you explain what the beginning
24		of that November 17th document describes, the pages

before Mr. Labrecque's technical statement. 1 (Puzio) This includes the updated Energy Service rate 2 А 3 and the so-called "Default Energy Service rate" that 4 we filed on November 17th. 5 MR. EATON: Thank you. Could we have that document marked as "Exhibit 2" for identification. 6 7 CHAIRMAN GETZ: So marked. (The document, as described, was 8 herewith marked as Exhibit 2 for 9 identification.) 10 11 BY MR. EATON: 12 Mr. Puzio, could you summarize PSNH's request for a 0 13 Default Energy Service rate beginning on January 1st, 2007? 14 15 (Puzio) Yes. The Energy Service rate that currently А 16 is being billed by PSNH that began on July 1, 2006 is 17 8.18 cents per kWh. The proposed 2007 rate is 8.59 18 cents per kWh, an increase of 0.41 cents per kWh. 19 This increase impacts PSNH's overall rates by 20 three percent, essentially an increase to the rates, 21 combined with the stranded cost rate decrease that we 22 testified to earlier this morning, the overall rates 23 for PSNH will increase one percent. The primary 24 reason for the increases is the fact that the current

[Witness panel: Puzio | Hall | Labrecque]

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1		rate in 2007 has a lower prior period adjustment. In
2		July 2006, we filed an Energy Service rate that had
3		\$36 million overrecovery for the period of February
4		through June 2006. And, that really decreased the
5		rate, because the fundamentals of the market energy
6		rates are essentially slightly lower now than they
7		were in 2006. However, we don't have that large
8		prior period overrecovery to mitigate that rate.
9	Q	What do you predict for an over- or underrecovery for
10		the year 2006 in the Energy Service rate?
11	A	(Puzio) Currently, in this filing, in Exhibit 2, has
12		approximately 10.9 million overrecovery for the
13		period of July through December. It has actual data
14		to through October and a projection for November
15	1	and December.
16	Q	And, how does \$10 million compare to the total energy
17		cost that PSNH collects through its Default Energy
18		Service rate?
19	A	(Puzio) In proportion to the total rate?
20	Q	Yes.
21	A	(Puzio) It's approximately 0.1 cent per kWh. It's a
22		little higher.
23	Q	Mr. Hall, could you explain or summarize your
24		testimony regarding the anti-gaming mechanism.

1	A	(Hall) Certainly. I start by defining what "gaming"
2		means. And, the definition of "gaming" is different
3		to different people. And, I know Mr. Traum submitted
4		testimony with a definition of "gaming", and his
5		definition differs from mine. That's not to say that
6		I'm right and he's wrong, it's just a different
7		opinion as to what constitutes "gaming". The way I
8		define "gaming" is an arrangement between a customer
9		and a supplier where the supplier effectively relies
10		on PSNH as a hedge for its energy costs. And, what I
11		mean by that is that I view "gaming" as a situation
12		where a supplier retains the right to require a
13		customer to return to Energy Service from PSNH during
14		times when the market price of energy is particularly
15		high. And, the supplier pays the customer the
16		difference between the contracted price between the
17		customer and the supplier and PSNH's Energy Service
18		rate.
19		I go on to say in my testimony that we
20		have not observed any actions that we would view as
21		"gaming". We only recently have had any significant
22		customer migration. Customer migration began in
23		large part in the early part of 2006, the March/April
24		time frame, and continued essentially through

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1September, where upwards of 100 customers, large2customers, left PSNH's Energy Service and took energy3service from a competitive supplier. So, my4conclusion is that we don't believe that a gaming5anti-gaming mechanism today is necessary.6Nevertheless, in the event that the7Commission does decide to adopt an anti-gaming8mechanism, we're recommending that it be somewhat9innocuous and not draconian. And, what we're10proposing is that, should the Commission go down that11road, we're suggesting that the anti-gaming mechanism12be that, if the customer returns to FSNH from a13particular competitive supplier, they can't then go14back to that same competitive supplier within a six15month time frame. I think that would prevent the16type of gaming that I define in my testimony.17And, some of the caveats that I had in18my testimony with regard to any anti-gaming proposal19is, you want to be careful that it doesn't result in20a situation where customers are reluctant to go to21the competitive market in the first place. If you22get an anti-gaming mechanism that is really harsh or23will cost customers some money if they happen to jump24back and forth, then customers may not even want to		
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	24	back and forth, then customers may not even want to

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1		take energy service from a competitive supplier to
2		begin with. They may just stay with PSNH. And,
3		we're we encourage customers to take service from
4		the competitive market, to the extent that they have
5		opportunities available to them. And, quite frankly,
6		that should be encouraged. So, I would urge the
7		Commission, if they do decide to adopt a mechanism,
8		that be careful in what it is that you adopt, because
9		you don't want to set up a situation that acts as a
10		barrier to a customer going to the competitive
11		market.
12		Alternatively, what I would really
13		recommend is that we simply continue to monitor the
14		situation and provide information to the Commission
15		and the parties with regard to customer migration, so
16		that we can assess over time whether gaming is
17		occurring.
18	Q	Mr. Hall, what would be your position if the
19		Commission were to ask you to determine what the
20		customer's motive was for moving off or moving back
21		to the PSNH system?
22	A	(Hall) I don't think we could do that. Because it
23		really isn't an objective standard, and we'd have to
24		really get into what a customer's thinking was with

1		regard to moving back and forth. So, I'm not sure,
2		in fact, I don't think that it would be possible for
3		me to determine why a customer went from PSNH to a
4		competitive supplier and back.
5	Q	So, would you favor a rather objective standard, no
6		matter what it is, that PSNH could administer easily
7		and objectively then, just a hard line of "yes" or
8		"no"?
9	A	(Hall) Absolutely. And, the anti-gaming mechanism
10		that I set forth, and, frankly, the one that Mr.
11		Traum sets forth in his testimony, those are
12		objective measurements. They're relatively easy to
13		administer. But, like I said earlier, be careful in
14		what you implement.
15	Q	Do you have anything more to add to your testimony,
16		Mr. Hall?
17	А	(Hall) I don't.
18	Q	Mr. Labrecque or Mr. Puzio, do you have anything to
19		add to your testimony?
20	A	(Puzio) I don't.
21	A	(Labrecque) No.
22		MR. EATON: Thank you very much. The
23	witn	esses are available for cross-examination.
24		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Thank you. Mr.

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1	Camerino.	
2	MR. CAMERINO: Tha	ank you, Mr. Chairman.
3	I think my questions are for Mr. Puz	zio, but it may be that
4	Mr. Labrecque is better suited to at	least these initial
5	questions.	
6	CROSS-EXAMINATIO	N
7	BY MR. CAMERINO:	
8	Q Mr. Puzio, if I'm looking at th	ne updated filing
9	correctly, you're indicating the	nat, for the period
10	July through December of this	year, the Company is
11	projecting an overcollection of	f Energy Service
12	revenues of about \$10.9 million	n, is that correct?
13	A (Puzio) That's correct.	
14	Q All right. Could you just wall	k me through slowly the
15	components that make that up?	In other words, lower
16	sales, higher costs, that type	of thing, just
17	identify roughly what the compo	onents of that are, and
18	maybe put dollar amounts on the	em if you can?
19	A (Puzio) In essence, the energy	market softened in the
20	second half of 2006. You reco	llect PSNH filed for a
21	rate for July through December	that contained both a
22	prior period underrecovery of	36 million and a
23	forecast overrecovery of about	10 million. However,
24	at that time, the markets were	very volatile, as

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1		indicated in the first part of 2006. And, I believe
2		the Commission decided to just reflect the actual
3		overrecovery for the first half of the year, and not
4		reflect the forecasted overrecovery in the second
5		half of the year, because it wasn't known whether it
6		would happen or not. And, in actual, the markets
7		continued to be soft as we had forecasted it back
8		then.
9	Q	So, I want to restate what you said, and if I've got
10		this wrong, let me know. In the first half of the
11		year, there was an overrecovery of approximately
12		\$36 million, which resulted from lower than
13		anticipated energy costs, is that correct?
14	A	(Puzio) Yes.
15	Q	And, in the second half of the year, the almost
16		\$11 million overrecovery is also largely the result
17		of lower than projected energy costs?
18	A	(Puzio) That's correct.
19	Q	Okay. I think my other questions then are for Mr.
20		Hall. Mr. Hall, first of all, would you agree that a
21		significant, if not the most important, goal of the
22		restructuring of the electric markets in New
23		Hampshire was to create a competitive electric supply
24		market?

1	A	(Hall) That was definitely one of the goals. I'm not
2		sure if it was "the most significant", but I'll
3		accept the fact that that was a goal.
4	Q	A significant goal?
5	A	(Hall) I'd have to go back and review the law, but
6		I'll accept that.
7	Q	Okay. Is it your view that that market, at least up
8		until now, has been slow to develop?
9	A	(Hall) Yes.
10	Q	Are you concerned about creating obstacles to the
11		creation of such a market?
12	A	(Hall) Yes, I am. And, that's the reason for my
13		admonition with respect to the to what type of
14		mechanism, if any, is implemented with regard to
15		anti-gaming.
16	Q	I think you indicated that this year approximately
17		135 customers have taken supply from competitive
18		suppliers?
19	A	(Hall) Yes, sir.
20	Q	Prior to this year, approximately how many customers
21		have taken supply from competitive suppliers?
22	A	(Hall) I would say a handful. I don't have the exact
23		number, but it was nowhere near 135.
24	Q	In total, in all of the time since PSNH first entered

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1		the competitive era?
2	A	(Hall) Yes, it might be a few dozen.
3	Q	Okay. Does your proposal, as submitted to the
4		Commission, and I don't want to maybe it's not
5		your proposal, the plan that you identify in your
6		testimony, does that have any mechanism for dealing
7		with what I'll call "administrative errors", if
8		somebody is dropped from a supplier by error of the
9		supplier or by error of the utility, is there
10		anything that addresses that situation?
11	А	(Hall) Not in what Not in what I proposed, no.
12	Q	And, have you seen any of the kind of gaming behavior
13		that you described, and when I say "you", has the
14		Company seen any of the gaming behavior that you
15		described earlier in your testimony, any evidence
16		that that type of behavior is occurring to date?
17	А	(Hall) No.
18		MR. CAMERINO: Thank you. That's all I
19	have	•
20		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Ms. Hatfield.
21		MS. HATFIELD: Thank you.
22	BY MS.	HATFIELD:
23	Q	I think my first question is for Mr. Puzio. And, I'm
24		looking at Exhibit 2, which is the updated filing, on

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1		Attachment RAB-1, Page 1. I'm wondering if you can
2		please tell us, on line 27, what is the forecasted
3	l	retail megawatt-hour sales for 2007?
4	А	(Puzio) We have shown 8,169,970 megawatt-hours,
5		assuming that we have no migration.
6	Q	And, actually, that leads right to my next question,
7		which is for Mr. Labrecque. And, looking at data
8		responses to OCA data requests that were filed on
9		October 23rd, this would be a response to OCA-002.
10		And, that's also "Attachment 2" to Mr. Traum's
11		testimony. And, Mr. Labrecque, in that response, you
12		first, I believe, say that your base assumption is
13		that 100 percent of customers currently receiving
14		energy service from a competitive supplier, that
15		you're assuming that they'll return to PSNH Energy
16		Service on the 1st January 1st of 2007, is that
17		correct?
18	A	(Labrecque) That's correct.
19	Q	But then you go on further down in your response.
20		And, I'm wondering if you can talk about Point Number
21	1	4 and discuss how that aligns with the earlier part
22		of your response that we just discussed?
23	A	(Labrecque) Point Number 4, the point I'm trying to
24		make there is that, if we have a mild winter or even

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1		a normal winter, such that some of the some of the
2		risk premiums are removed from the forward energy
3		market, we could get to late March, early April, like
4		we did in 2006, in 2007, where the competitive costs
5		for energy service may have declined to eight and a
6		half cents, eight cents, seven and a half cents,
7		something lower than our filed rate request, such
8		that there could be a repeat in '07 of what happened
9		in '06. And, when I say "there could be", I mean
10		it's not a farfetched scenario. That's where I think
11		I used the word "significant" likelihood that that
12		could happen.
13	Q	I think, in Number 4, what you say is "PSNH considers
14		the potential for migration to be significant", is
15		that
16	A	(Labrecque) That's correct.
17	Q	Okay. Turning to Mr. Hall, I believe that you just
18		testified that there are different ways to define
19		"gaming". And, I think you said that perhaps you and
20		Mr. Traum disagree in your definitions. And, I did
21		just want to point out that, in Mr. Traum's
22		testimony, which we'll be discussing when he's on the
23		stand, he uses the definition that the Commission
24		actually set forth in their order in DE 05-164. And,

1		I was wondering if you were aware that that was
2		actually the Commission's definition of "gaming"?
3	A	(Hall) I'm aware of that. I still don't agree with
4		it.
5	Q	I think you also just testified, in response to a
6		question from Mr. Camerino, that you agree that one
7		of the major goals of restructuring was to create a
8		competitive energy market, is that correct?
9	A	(Hall) Yes.
10	Q	I think also, though, that the Legislature made clear
11		in the restructuring statute that, while that was
12		clearly one of the main goals, that the Legislature
13		also clearly stated that it should be implemented,
14		and I'm quoting from RSA 374-F:3, VI, that "it should
15		be implemented in a manner that benefits all
16		consumers equitably and does not benefit one customer
17		class to the detriment of another." So, would you
18		agree that, while a competitive market is clearly a
19		major goal, that we also have to be careful about who
20		pays for the development of that competitive market?
21	A	(Hall) Yes. I viewed that portion of the law as
22		applying to something different. I viewed that as
23		applying more to the overall rate decrease that was
24		implemented when restructuring took effect.

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1	Q	So, are you saying that, if there are costs involved
2		with developing a competitive market, it's okay if
3		one particular customer class pays for those costs?
4	A	(Hall) Well, there's always discrimination between
5		classes. That is a fact of life when it comes to
6		ratemaking. There is There are always subsidies.
7		Some customer classes always subsidize other classes.
8		Some particular customers subsidize other customers
9		in their class. The task for the Commission to
10		determine is whether that discrimination is undue.
11	ł	And, they have to assess all of the factors and make
12		a decision.
13		MS. HATFIELD: Thank you. I don't have
14	any	further questions.
	1	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Ms. Amidon.
15		CRAINTAN GELZ: MS. AMUDON.
15 16		MS. AMIDON: Thank you.
	BY MS.	
16	BY MS. Q	MS. AMIDON: Thank you.
16 17		MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON:
16 17 18		MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON: Mr. Hall, I thought did you say, in response to
16 17 18 19		MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON: Mr. Hall, I thought did you say, in response to Steve Camerino's question, that there were dozens of
16 17 18 19 20	Q	MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON: Mr. Hall, I thought did you say, in response to Steve Camerino's question, that there were dozens of migrations in February of 2006?
16 17 18 19 20 21	Q	MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON: Mr. Hall, I thought did you say, in response to Steve Camerino's question, that there were dozens of migrations in February of 2006? (Hall) Yes. Yes, there may have been a couple of
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q	MS. AMIDON: Thank you. AMIDON: Mr. Hall, I thought did you say, in response to Steve Camerino's question, that there were dozens of migrations in February of 2006? (Hall) Yes. Yes, there may have been a couple of dozen, off and on. The reason that I say that is

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1		General Service and Residential. That customer took
2		self supply service, which I kind of lump into the
3		same category as competitive supply, service from a
4		competitive supplier. I wasn't technically accurate
5		in my response to Mr. Camerino. It wasn't all
6		customers who have gone to competitive suppliers.
7	Q	Looking at Exhibit 1, at your testimony, Page 4,
8		there's a statement that says "From February 2006
9		through September 2006, 135 customers ceased taking
10		energy service from PSNH and began taking energy
11		service from the competitive market", and I won't
12		read the rest of the sentence. Is that what you're
13		talking about? And, how do you explain the 135 with
14		the "dozens" that you referenced here, I just want to
15		understand?
16	A	(Hall) Well, the 135 are the number of customers who
17		ceased taking service from PSNH in the time frame
18		that I described, and a customer is an account.
19	Q	Okay.
20	A	(Hall) You could have one company or one entity with
21		more than one account. So, maybe that's the reason
22		for the confusion. And, with regard to prior to
23		2006, I think I said "maybe a couple of dozen". It
24		might have been less. I'm basing it on my

1		recollection. I don't know the exact number. The
2		only point I was making is it wasn't anywhere near
3		100.
4	Q	Do you know how much it represented in terms of power
5		usage, megawatt-hours?
6	A	(Hall) Amount of power, megawatt-hours? I don't have
7		that information, but it was a small fraction of the
8		amount that occurred in 2006.
9	Q	I'd like to turn now to Mr. Labrecque. And, in
10		reference to the attachment to Mr. Traum's testimony,
11		which is OCA Data Request Set 1, Number 002. If you
12		could go to Item Number 6 in that response. This is
13		in response to a question about "How does PSNH plan
14		purchases regarding recognizing the possibility of
15		migration due to customer choice?" In this response
16		you are talking about two alternatives to acquire
17		power based on these unknowns. What decision did
18		PSNH ultimately make with respect to these two
19		alternatives?
20	A	(Labrecque) We're still working on the call option
21		strategy. That is our preferred path right now.
22		And, we're in negotiation with a supplier for just
23		the type of product we feel would best address this
24		situation.

1	Q	So, you have chosen Option (b)?
2	A	(Labrecque) Option (b) is our preferred path right
3		now.
4	Q	When do you make a final decision?
5	А	(Labrecque) If we're able to reach an agreement with
6		this counterparty, hopefully, in the next few days, a
7		week, we would execute, you know, a series of
8		contracts to implement this proposal. If we are not,
9		we'd fall back to something, some other strategy.
10	Q	Okay. I don't know if this is for Mr. Puzio or
11		Mr. Labrecque. But, if you look at Exhibit 2, at
12		that technical statement, which begins three pages
13		from the back, that technical statement includes a
14		couple of relevant tables, Page 2 of 2 and page
15		Page 2 of 3 and Page 3 of 3. On Page 2 of 3, there
16		is no reference, is there, to the \$10.9 million
17		credit?
18	А	(Labrecque) No.
19	Q	So, overall, the forecasted cost is about \$29 million
20		less than originally expected in September?
21	A	(Labrecque) The forecasted costs for 2007 are
22		18 million less.
23	A	(Puzio) In addition, we had 10.9 million overrecovery
24		from 2006. Together, yes.

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1	Q	Okay. Could you give us a little more detail about
2		the 18 million?
3	A	(Labrecque) Yes. The 18 million is detailed on Page
4		2 of 3, the different elements that made up it. The
5		largest chunks are the fact that the net purchase
6		expense declined by 22 million, while net IPP expense
7		increased by nearly 5 million. The reason for the
8		decrease in net purchases is partly related to lower
9		market prices today compared to in September, the
10	ļ	draft filing.
11	Q	And, is that illustrated on Page 3 of 3 of that
12	1	technical statement?
13	A	(Labrecque) Yes. The drop in prices is provided in
14	l I	Footnote D.
15	Q	But I just have I think one last question. What is
16		the percentage of power that you expect to purchase?
17	А	(Labrecque) This filing includes somewhere in the
18		range of 30, 30 percent of our energy supply is from
19	ļ	market-based purchases. It's not including IPPs.
20	Q	Okay.
21	A	(Labrecque) Of the 30 percent, 18 percent or
22		60 percent of the 30 has already been procured at
23	1	fixed known prices, and that's reflected in this
24		filing. The remaining portion, approximately half of

1	i	t relates to this call option, this allowance for a
2	F	portion of our load that we feel is subject to
3	n	nigration. And, the remainder is related mostly to
4	t	the annualized derate that we apply to the base load
5	c	coal plants and that and last year we procured the
6	n	majority of that power in advance, you know, on an
7	ā	annualized basis. This year we're proposing to
8	F	procure that power in more shorter term procurements
9	ć	as these forced outages occur. That's not to say, in
10	t	the next few weeks, we may not hedge a portion of
11	t	that exposure, but we don't plan to hedge all of it.
12		MS. AMIDON: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I
13	have r	no more questions.
14		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Thank you.
15	BY CHAII	RMAN GETZ:
16	Q	Okay. Mr. Hall, I just have a couple of questions
17	ć	about the gaming issue. As I understand your
18	1	testimony, you're essentially concluding that it's
19	1	premature to implement a anti-gaming proposal,
20	]	because you see no real evidence that gaming, however
21	-	it's defined, is taking place? Is that a fair
22	:	reading of part of your testimony?
23	А	(Hall) Yes, sir.
24	Q	And, I take it you've also reviewed, from your

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

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1		comments, you reviewed Mr. Traum's proposal. And, I
2		guess another part of your testimony you admonished
3	l	us and cautioned us and warned us against adopting a
4		proposal that might provide a barrier to competitive
5		choice. Could you explain, with respect to Mr.
6		Traum's proposed Option Number 1, how that would, in
7		your view, erect a barrier to competitive choice?
8	A	(Hall) Sure. First, let me say that the difference
9		of opinion that Mr. Traum and I have is just that,
10		it's a matter of opinion. I respect his point of
11		view and I accept the fact that he and I have an
12		honest difference of opinion as to what "gaming"
13		means. With regard to how his proposal will harm the
14		competitive market, I have to say that his proposal
15		is relatively innocuous in that it doesn't impose any
16		monetary penalty on a customer for jumping back and
17		forth. But the perception that a customer might have
18	<b>)</b>	that, once they return, that if they leave PSNH to go
19		to a competitive supplier and then return, they're
20	ļ	essentially stuck with PSNH for a 12-month period,
21		arguably could cause a customer to think, think hard
22		about their decision, especially if a supplier is
23		offering them an option to take power for like a
24		six-month period. It really would depend on the type

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1		of options and the terms of service that suppliers
2		might be offering to a customer.
3	Q	Well, that gets me back to the definition of
4		"gaming".
5	A	(Hall) Uh-huh.
6	Q	Which Mr. Traum lays out in his testimony in
7		referring to a Commission order that defined "gaming"
8	1	as "the strategic migration to and from PSNH's Energy
9		Service so as to take advantage of price fluctuations
10		in a manner that imposes unfair recovery burdens on
11		customers that may be unable to migrate due to such
12		factors as the lack of competitive suppliers." Do
13		you have a I'm trying to understand this. You
14		have a dispute with that general definition or is it
15		you have a difference of opinion on what type of
16		strategies individuals might use that might
17		constitute gaming?
18	А	(Hall) When you get right down to it, if a customer
19		were jumping back and forth between PSNH and the
20		competitive market in a relatively short-term basis,
21		I can see how one could conclude that was gaming.
22		And, in fact, you know, from one perspective, the
23		customer is gaming, in that they're looking at the
24		lowest cost option from time to time. It's a fine

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1	line between defining whether a customer exercising
2	an economic choice, moving back and forth between the
3	market, falls into falls onto the side of gaming
4	or whether it's simply the way that the competitive
5	market ought to operate, with the fallback position
6	the customer has of Default Energy Service. And,
7	that's really a judgment call that you have to make,
8	and that's why you're sitting in that chair and I'm
9	sitting over here.
10	Q And, I take it from the questions that Mr. Eaton was
11	asking you that you certainly are not proposing that
12	the intent of the customer is any how is any way a
13	element of whether there's a violation of gaming?
14	A (Hall) Yes, sir. I hope you don't require us to try
15	to read the customer's mind and figure out what the
16	customer is thinking or their motivation for
17	switching. That I don't think I'd be able to do.
18	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Mr. Eaton, any redirect?
19	WITNESS HALL: Jerry.
20	CMSR. BELOW: Can you hold on one
21	second? Sort of your questions triggered some questions.
22	BY CMSR. BELOW:
23	Q Mr. Hall, of the 135 customers who switched between
24	February and September of this year, how many have

come back at this point? 1 (Hall) Let me see if I have that data with me. 2 А I'm 3 not sure if I do. (Short pause.) 4 5 CONTINUED BY THE WITNESS: 6 А (Hall) I believe that, through October, other than 7 the four customers that I talked about that had returned and then gone back to the same competitive 8 supplier, I don't believe any other customers, as of 9 the end of October, have returned to PSNH. 10 11 BY CMSR. BELOW: But, for planning for 2007, you've assumed that they 12 0 would all come back --13 14 (Hall) Yes, sir. А 15 -- by January 1st? Q 16 А (Hall) Yes, sir. We're operating under the 17 assumption that these customers entered into relatively short-term arrangements that would expire 18 19 at the end of 2006. And, in fact, we asked a couple 20 of discovery requests to the two suppliers who were 21 intervening in this proceeding. And, the response 22 that we got from one of them was that the 23 arrangements that that supplier had entered into all 24 terminated by the end of '06.

[Witness panel: Puzio|Hall|Labrecque]

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1	Q	So, is that the basis of your assumption that there
2		would be 100 percent return by the first of the year?
3	А	(Hall) You mean that data response?
4	Q	Yes.
5	А	(Hall) No, that wasn't the basis. I'll turn to you.
6	А	(Labrecque) Yes. The basis for that assumption is
7		that this ramp-up from zero to 135 customers was
8		fairly swift in late February, mid March, April, say.
9		At that time, there had been a dramatic drop in the
10		price of power for, let's just say, April to December
11		of '06. But the price of forward energy for January,
12		February, and March of '07 was still extreme, you
13		know, it still it hadn't the natural gas
14		collapse was more a short-term phenomenon. So, I
15		don't believe that competitive suppliers were able,
16		in March, April of '06 to offer a price for the first
17		three months of '07 that would have been competitive
18		with what most customers would have foreseen to be
19		potentially PSNH's rate in 2007. So, I don't believe
20		there was a market opportunity there for customers.
21	Q	So, we have a situation where between, in the first
22		half of this year, there was something like a
23		\$36 million overrecovery, is that about right?
24	A	(Puzio) That's correct.

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

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1	Q	And, in a sense, about 25, 24, 25 million of that has
2		been returned to customers or is projected to be
3		returned to customers by the end of this calendar
4		year, so that the net overrecovery is only the 10
5		point something, 10.9 million.
6	A	(Puzio) Actually, the 36 million is being refunded in
7		the second half of the year. An additional
8		10.9 million has been deferred or overcollected
9		during the July through December period. The
10		36 million relates to the February through June 2006
11		period.
12	Q	Right. So, but in netting those out, what would be
13		the net overrecovery for the whole calendar year?
14	A	(Puzio) It would have been about \$46 million, \$47
15		million.
16	A	(Hall) Absent the change in the rate on July 1st.
17	Q	I'm confused.
18	A	(Hall) The rate, the energy rate decreased on
19		July 1st
20	Q	Right.
21	A	(Hall) because a large overrecovery had occurred.
22		Had that rate not changed, that overrecovery would
23		have continued to grow from \$36 million at the end of
24		June to about \$46 million at the end of the year.

1		Because the rate was dropped, the 36 million in the
2	1	first half of the year was refunded in the second
		half, but we still had that \$10 million overrecovery
3		
4		in the second half of the year, leaving us a balance
5		at the end of the year of about 10 million.
6	Q	Right. But couldn't one say that there was, on net,
7		about a 20 \$24 million net refunding of
8		overrecovery during the second half of this year? I
9		mean, if you start the period with 36 million
10		overrecovery, and you end the period with about
11		11 million overrecovery, the net difference is about
12		20 25 million?
13	A	(Hall) Okay. I'm with you. The overrecovery was
14		reduced by about 25, 26 million in the second half,
15		correct.
16	Q	Okay. Now, I guess what I'm trying to think through
17		in the sort of anti-gaming question, going forward in
18		after the first of this year, the rate, because of
19		that overrecovery, rates are going to be somewhat
20		lower than they might would have been otherwise.
21		If we ended the year with zero overrecovery, rates
22		that the energy rate would be somewhat higher going
23		forward. To the extent that customers who, during
24		most of this year, were not taking Default Energy

1		Service, they didn't actually participate in
2		contributing towards that overrecovery. But, to the
3		extent that they come back, they will participate in
4		essentially the refunding of that overrecovery?
5	А	(Hall) True.
6		
	Q	Does that concern you?
7	А	(Hall) To a certain extent, yes. But that is, again,
8		that's the nature of ratemaking. Customers are
9		moving all the time. You know, this is an age-old
10		argument, where I remember many years ago we were
11		talking about going from a monthly fuel charge to a
12		quarterly to an annual fuel charge, and the argument
13		there are "well, if you get a seasonal customer that
14		only uses power during the summer, then they are
15	ĺ	somehow getting the benefit or they're getting
16		unfairly burdened by costs that are being over
17	ļ	recovered or under recovered in a different period."
18		It's one of the issues that we have to struggle with.
19		And, that issue is, you know, "is it undue
20		discrimination?"
21		To put it in perspective, a \$10 million
22		underrecovery is a difference of about 0.125 cents in
23		the rate. That's ballpark. A little over a mill per
24		kilowatt-hour, tenth of a cent.

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1	Q	So, your point being, it's a small it's small in
2		the bigger scheme of things, so it's not
3	A	(Hall) Yes, sir.
4	Q	which is a reason why it's not a big concern at
5		this point. It's theoretically possible, if the
6		market changed dramatically, we could end up with a
7		situation where its relative size was much bigger
8		where it might be a greater concern?
9	A	(Hall) Yes, sir.
10		CMSR. BELOW: Okay. Thank you.
11		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Redirect?
12		MR. EATON: Just a second.
13		(Atty. Eaton conferring with Witness
14		Hall.)
15		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
16	BY MR.	EATON:
17	Q	Mr. Hall, you have a document in front of you. Could
18		you please describe that.
19	А	(Hall) Sure.
20	Q	Could you describe that document. I think everyone
21		has it.
22	A	(Hall) Sure. This is a bar chart that shows the
23		weighted average cost per megawatt-hour of serving
24		load, residential versus our largest class, Rate LG.

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1	And, I put this chart together in the context of the
2	discrimination discussion that we had earlier on the
3	record. Ken and I had a similar discussion,
4	Mr. Traum and I had a similar discussion during a
5	technical session. And, one of the questions that
6	OCA had was "well, gee, our smaller customers is
7	effectively subsidizing larger customers through the
8	rates that they pay, either from from an energy
9	perspective. And, therefore, when larger customers
10	leave and return, aren't they getting an unfair
11	advantage over smaller customers?" And, I was really
12	intrigued by the discussion, and I didn't know what
13	the answer was.
14	So, what I did is, I looked at the
15	average cost of serving a typical residential load
16	and compared it to the average cost of serving a
17	typical large customer load. And, to calculate the
18	average, and this is from an energy perspective, to
19	calculate the average energy cost, we used the data,
20	hourly data that's underlying our forecast in
21	proposed rate of 8.59 cents per kilowatt-hour. And,
22	we applied that hourly data to a residential load
23	shape and came up with a weighted average cost per
24	megawatt-hour, and we did the same thing to a typical

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1	large customer load shape. And, what we found is
2	that, in each and every month, the weighted average
3	cost of serving a residential load is slightly higher
4	than the weighted average cost of serving a large
5	customer load from an energy perspective.
6	My conclusion from this is that there is
7	no subsidy by residential customers from an energy
8	perspective of the large customer class. And, in
9	fact, it costs more to serve a residential customer
10	on a weighted average energy cost than it does for a
11	large customer.
12	MS. HATFIELD: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
13	actually object to PSNH introducing a new document at this
14	point that we have not had a chance to review, that we
15	have not had a chance to ask them discovery about. And, I
16	also don't know how this is actually germane to the issue
17	of gaming, which I think that's why the Company is
18	bringing it in. So, I'm not sure, maybe we can take a few
19	minutes to do that now, or but I just wanted to get
20	that on the record. Thank you.
21	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Mr. Eaton, your
22	response?
23	MR. EATON: Well, perhaps Mr. Hall could
24	explain a little more on how this was calculated and why

1	the differences show up.
2	BY MR. EATON:
3	Q Could you explain how these figures were calculated,
4	what data did you use?
5	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Well, I guess one of the
6	questions that was in my mind is "how much weight to give
7	this document, without the workpapers behind the
8	conclusions?" And, so, I guess if you could maybe
9	explain, either or both of you, what, you know, responding
10	to Ms. Hatfield's question, for what purpose this document
11	is proposed in aiding our decision in this proceeding?
12	BY THE WITNESS:
13	A (Hall) Well, the reason that I suggested introducing
14	it gets to the discussion that we had earlier on
15	cross-exam with regard to "whether there is
16	discrimination between classes". That's the whole
17	purpose, is to show that the concern that there is
18	somehow discrimination that favors the large customer
19	class, that the data that I have here is attempting
20	to show just the opposite. Or, if not the opposite,
21	that there that at least the discrimination
22	doesn't exist.
23	(Chairman and Commissioners conferring.)
24	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Well, Mr. Eaton, I take

1	it you'd like to propose this be marked for
2	identification, is that
3	MR. EATON: Yes, but it's but it's
4	not crucial. We thought it would be helpful for the
5	Commission, as far as explaining what the status is before
6	before migration or gaming take place.
7	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Well, let's do it this
8	way then. We'll mark it for identification as "Exhibit
9	Number 3". We will overrule the objection to its entry
10	into the as an exhibit. But we'll note for the record
11	that, inasmuch as there are no workpapers have been
12	provided backing up the conclusions, that we will give it
13	the weight it is due in such regard.
14	(The document, as described, was
15	herewith marked as <b>Exhibit 3</b> for
16	identification.)
17	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Is there anything else,
18	Mr. Eaton?
19	MR. EATON: No thank you.
20	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Anything else for this
21	panel? Mr. Camerino.
22	MR. CAMERINO: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I
23	just wanted to follow up very briefly with Mr. Hall on a
24	question from Commissioner Below.

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

		[Withess panet. Puzio[haii[Labiecque]
1		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Please.
2		CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)
3	BY MR.	CAMERINO:
4	Q	Mr. Hall, prior to this year, can you just explain
5		the method by which overrecoveries or underrecoveries
6		of Energy Service revenues, Transition Service
7		revenues were collected? Did they come through the
8		Energy Service rate or did they go through a
9		different portion of the rate?
10	A	(Hall) It was the latter. Overrecoveries and
11		underrecoveries of energy costs, prior to 2006, were
12		added to or subtracted from the balance of
13		nonsecuritized stranded costs. Because there no
14		longer is a balance of nonsecuritized stranded costs,
15		over- and underrecoveries of energy costs now are
16		flowed through the prospective Energy Service charge.
17	Q	And, by passing those over-/underrecoveries back
18		through the Stranded Cost Recovery Charge, were they
19		paid by all customers, regardless of whether they
20		were taking energy service, or only by some
21		customers?
22	A	(Hall) No. They are only credited to or paid by
23		those customers that take energy service from PSNH.
24	Q	And, maybe you didn't understand my question. When

[Witness panel: Puzio|Hall|Labrecque]

the over-/underrecoveries were passed through the 1 2 SCRC, the Stranded Cost Recovery Charge, --А (Hall) I'm sorry. 3 -- which groups of customers paid or received the 4 0 5 benefits of those amounts, when it went through the SCRC? 6 А (Hall) When over- or underrecoveries were credited to 7 or added to the balance of Part 3 stranded costs, all 8 9 Delivery Service customers either got the benefit of 10 the overrecovery or paid for an underrecovery of 11 energy costs. 12 MR. CAMERINO: Okay. Thank you. 13 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Anything else for the 14 panel? 15 MS. HATFIELD: No. 16 CMSR. BELOW: Well, I have a question to 17 understand this a little bit more. BY CMSR. BELOW: 18 19 0 You say you've applied hourly data. Now, in your 20 Page 3 of 3 of the technical statement at the end of 21 Exhibit 2, you have for some power purchases 22 differential in rates based on time of purchase, for 23 the Footnote E. And, I -- looks like there's some 24 also relative to D, with regard to the purchases from

[Witness panel: Puzio|Hall|Labrecque]

{DE 06-125} (11-21-06)

1		IPPs. But, to the extent that roughly 70 percent of
2		your generation is self supply, was there any attempt
3		to do hourly differentiation in the cost of energy
4		for that purpose or what components were put into
5		developing the weighted average?
6	A	(Hall) This is exclusively a marginal cost analysis.
7		It doesn't include the embedded cost of generation.
8		It is It's a calculation of the cost of serving or
9		an additional kilowatt of load in each hour or the
10		savings that results from not having to serve a
11		decremental kilowatt in each hour.
12	Q	So, what is being weighted? What Is the margin
13		presumed to be the market, market price from ISO-New
14		England? Is that assumed at the day ahead pricing or
15		the
16	А	(Labrecque) I can answer that, Steve. For the energy
17		simulation that forms the basis of the energy piece
18		of this filing, we take the forward market prices,
19		you know, quoted as of a certain day. And, if you
20		look at Footnote D, that middle block there, the
21		11/17 filing, those are the monthly averages for
22		those time periods. But we then break out this
23		monthly data into hourly data. So, we actually
24		transform the forward monthly markets into 8,760

1		hours of hourly prices, marginal prices, to use in
2		the energy simulation for, say, the IPP at market
3		valuation and any supplemental purchases that we
4		haven't procured at fixed prices. So, we use those
5		hourly prices to weight the representative load
6		profiles of the two classes on that sheet.
7	Q	So, in essence, it really reflects the marginal
8		incremental cost, not the average cost to serve these
9		customers, because the average cost would include the
10		70 percent of self supplies that has minimal time
11		differentiations, unless you try to start including
12		opportunity cost results to the market?
13	A	(Hall) From an average By "average" what I mean
14		is, it is a marginal cost in each hour, as described
15		by Mr. Labrecque, we added all those marginal costs
16		up hour by hour, and then divided by the
17		kilowatt-hours in the month to come up with an
18		average kilowatt-hour price per month or a
19		megawatt-hour price per month, cost per month.
20	Q	Thank you. I had another question on Footnote D.
21		For the IPP purchases, you're showing a capacity cost
22		at the Transition Capacity Charge. And, I'm just
23		curious in understanding, are those costs you
24		actually expected to incur, to be paid to those

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1	producers, above and beyond what the sort of rate
2	order requirements are? Is the assumption that they
3	own the capacity and are entitled to those payments
4	or
5	A (Hall) It's the value of that capacity price at
6	market.
7	Q Okay. So, you're this is the calculation, you're
8	not actually paying them capacity charges, you're
9	just paying them what's due under the rate orders?
10	A (Hall) Correct.
11	Q But you're trying to impute the market price to
12	deduct out the over market costs?
13	A (Hall) Yes, sir.
14	Q Okay. I understand.
15	A (Hall) The reason that we need to do that is because
16	we've got to split the way we recover the costs.
17	CMSR. BELOW: Right. I understand.
18	Okay. Thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Mr. Eaton?
20	MR. EATON: Nothing further.
21	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Okay. Then, the
22	witnesses are excused. Thank you. Ms. Hatfield.
23	MS. HATFIELD: Yes, the OCA would like
24	to call Ken Traum.

		[Witness: Traum]
1		(Whereupon Kenneth E. Traum was duly
2		sworn and cautioned by the Court
3		Reporter.)
4		KENNETH E. TRAUM, SWORN
5		DIRECT EXAMINATION
6	BY MS.	HATFIELD:
7	Q	Good morning. Would you please state your name for
8		the record.
9	А	Kenneth E. Traum.
10	Q	And, by whom are you employed?
11	А	I'm at the Office of Consumer Advocate.
12	Q	And, what is your position with the OCA and what are
13		your duties?
14	A	I'm the Assistant Consumer Advocate for the office.
15		And, my duties are far-ranging, in that I basically
16		get involved in all aspects of all types of dockets,
17		and advise the Consumer Advocate and work with the
18		Advisory Board of the office, and, as need be,
19		testify at the Legislature.
20	Q	And, have you excuse me. Have you testified
21		before this Commission previously?
22	A	Certainly more times than Mr. Puzio.
23	Q	And, did you prepare testimony for this proceeding
24		today, which was filed on November 7th, 2006?

		[witness: Traum]
1	А	Yes, I did.
2	Q	Do you have that testimony in front of you then?
3	А	Yes, I do.
4	Q	And, do you have any corrections or adjustments that
5		you need to make to that testimony?
6	A	No.
7	Q	Is it true and accurate to the best of your knowledge
8		and belief?
9	A	Yes, it is.
10	Q	And, do you adopt it today as your sworn testimony?
11	A	Yes, I do.
12		MS. HATFIELD: I would like to request
13	that	Mr. Traum's testimony and exhibits be marked for
14	iden	tification purposes I believe as "Exhibit 4".
15		CHAIRMAN GETZ: So marked.
16		(The document, as described, was
17		herewith marked as <b>Exhibit 4</b> for
18		identification.)
19	BY MS.	HATFIELD:
20	Q	Mr. Traum, would you please briefly summarize the
21		overall purpose of your testimony in this proceeding.
22	A	Certainly. My testimony only relates to the gaming
23		issue that we've already heard a lot of discussion
24		about. And, I'm looking at it from the perspective

[Witness: Traum]

1	of how to protect small customers from cost shifting.
2	And, this issue arose when the OCA raised it at last
3	summer's Energy Service rate hearing. And, you, the
4	Commissioners, responded by ordering PSNH to include
5	an anti-gaming proposal in the instant docket. And,
6	as has been referred to, in your order doing that,
7	you had defined "gaming" or you stated "We are
8	concerned about the potential for what some
9	characterize as "gaming", that is the strategic
10	migration to and from PSNH's energy service so as to
11	take advantage of price fluctuations in a manner that
12	imposes unfair recovery burdens on customers that may
13	be unable to migrate due to such factors as the lack
14	of competitive suppliers serving their market
15	segment. We note that other jurisdictions have
16	addressed this issue in similar circumstances." And,
17	I just wanted to stress where you noted that "other
18	jurisdictions have addressed this issue in similar
19	circumstances." We're not looking for you to invent
20	the wheel here. The wheel has been invented, has
21	been around for years, and not just in other
22	jurisdictions, but here in New Hampshire, too,
23	whether it's with the natural gas utilities or Unitil
24	and National Grid, with, in effect, the way their

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1	"anti-gaming rules", as I'll call them, have evolved.
2	PSNH did, in compliance with your order,
3	recommend an anti-gaming proposal, if you felt one
4	was necessary. But they certainly didn't support it.
5	And, from our viewpoint, we don't think it is strong
6	enough. And, we think it is a proper time for the
7	Commission to act proactively to establish
8	anti-gaming rules. And, one has to look no farther
9	than the data response that has already been
10	addressed in this proceeding, where PSNH has
11	recognized that they consider the potential for
12	migration to be significant in 2007, especially after
13	the volatile winter months of January and February.
14	And, our concern about migration is
15	that, at times of a favorable market pricing compared
16	to PSNH's average rate for Energy Service, a customer
17	can legitimately and economically will go to a lower
18	cost. And, I've used the hypothetical that, if
19	PSNH's average rate for the year is 9 cents, and in
20	certain months their costs, because of market prices,
21	say, in January and February, are 12 cents, a
22	customer can be on in January and February, they will
23	pay 9 cents a kilowatt-hour. However, if PSNH's is
24	incurring the cost of 12 cents, what happens to that

1	3 cent shortfall? Under the average pricing
2	mechanism, that 3 cent shortfall is picked up in
3	average cost months, in months where the average
4	market price is lower than the 9 cents.
5	If, instead that customer has left to a
6	competitive supply in those lower cost months, what
7	happens to that 3 cents? It's shifted to everybody
8	who stays. The residential or small customers are
9	stuck paying for it, because they don't have the
10	opportunity, they don't have the competitive supplier
11	opportunity to move.
12	And, I had referred in my testimony to
13	some options that we, the OCA, thought might be ways
14	to deal with its anti-gaming concern. Our preferred
15	option is that we'll allow customers the opportunity
16	to choose, at any point in time they can choose. If
17	they choose, and then, at some point, they decide
18	they want to return to Public Service's energy
19	supply, they can, but, at that point, they have to
20	stay on for at least 12 months. And, that's the way
21	we feel that we can address the anti-gaming concern.
22	And, we feel that that option is similar to the
23	structure now in place for KeySpan's customers in New
24	Hampshire and for Northern's customers in New

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1	Hampshire, and it is consistent with Connecticut
2	Light & Power's restrictions in Connecticut.
3	A second option that was not the
4	preferred option, but is certainly a very legitimate
5	option, is to bill customers who have competitive
6	supply options or large customers a monthly rate
7	based on PSNH's costs for the month. And, that would
8	be in New Hampshire that would be similar to large
9	customers of National Grid and in Unitil will see a
10	monthly rate. And, it's our understanding that that
11	is something similar to what WMECO's customers would
12	see. But, as I stated, our preference is, if you go
13	out and come back, you have to stay on for 12 months.
14	And, I believe that completes my short
15	summary.
16	MS. HATFIELD: Thank you. No further
17	questions.
18	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Well, actually, could we
19	I'll jump in.
20	BY CHAIRMAN GETZ:
21	Q Can you go right now to addressing Mr. Hall's concern
22	with respect to Option 1, whether you believe there's
23	any anti-competitive barrier that would be erected by
24	adopting your proposal?

1	A	Yes. I'm coming from a different viewpoint. I'm
2		trying to protect the small customers from cost
3		shifting. And, that's what our recommendation is
4		based upon. Having said that, yes, you can certainly
5		hypothesize that a customer would much prefer no
6		rules on when they can jump back and forth to
7		competitive sources and take the lowest price. And,
8		if they are prohibited in any 12-month period,
9		because they have already jumped back and forth, to
10		continue doing that, that that may preclude some, but
11		it may preclude those customers from entering the
12		competitive market, but it's protecting all of the
13		other customers. And, we're I think, as Mr. Hall
14		had said, we're looking at it from different
15		perspectives. And, just like when we look at the
16		reason the Legislature went to restructuring, was it
17		to develop a competitive market and was that the end
18		of the story or was it to bring lower rates to all
19		customers? I would say that the premiere concern was
20		to bring lower rates and bills to all customers.
21		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Thank you. Mr.
22	Came	erino, start with you.
23		MR. CAMERINO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24		CROSS-EXAMINATION

1	BY MR.	CAMERINO:
2	Q	Mr. Traum, let me start with just some general
3		questions about the comparisons you made. Is it fair
4		to say that the competitive electric market in the
5		other New England states that have restructured their
6		electric industries is considerably more vibrant than
7		the market in New Hampshire at this point, and
8		particularly with regard to PSNH's territory?
9	А	What we I don't know how vibrant that market
10		necessarily is in Connecticut. It's my understanding
11		that, certainly, in the New Hampshire service
12		territories of Grid and Unitil, the competitive
13		market for the large customers is relatively vibrant,
14		and there is monthly pricing there.
15	Q	Well, that's a fair exception. Would you then tell
16		me whether, in your view, the market design is
17		different in the Unitil and Grid territories than it
18		is in PSNH, with regard to generation and related
19		issues?
20	A	Well, absolutely, it is. And, the problem is, I'm
21		not sure if I should say the "problem", but
22		difference is that PSNH owns generation, and the
23		other two utilities don't.
24	Q	And, is it fair to say that that difference creates

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1		some significant differences in terms of the activity
2		in the competitive marketplace?
3	A	There are I think it would be fair to say that,
4		where PSNH's generation, I believe by legislation, is
5		to provide benefits to all customers, that creates an
6		issue that must be dealt with that's not there for
7		the other utilities in New Hampshire.
8	Q	And, am I correct, or at least to your knowledge, am
9		I correct that the restructuring statute doesn't
10		actually define "gaming"?
11	A	As far as I know, that's correct.
12	Q	And, is it also fair to say that the restructuring
13		statute has many competing principles, some might
14		even say "contradicting principles", that the
15		Commission is required to find a way to balance?
16	A	The Commission is, I believe by law, required to
17		interpret the legislation as it understands it.
18	Q	Are you familiar with the portion of the statute, and
19		I'm referring to 374-F, Section 3, V, which I think
20		was discussed previously, and subparagraph (c) of
21		that describes "Default Service". And, in there, one
22		of the attributes of one of the principles that the
23		Commission is supposed to implement is "discouraging
24		the long-term use of Default Service"?

[Witness: Traum]

1	A	Yes. In fact, I quoted it on Page 6 of my testimony.
2	Q	So, one of the goals the Legislature had was not to
3		have people stay on Default Service, but rather be
4		out in the competitive market, and I stress in my
5		question, that's one of the principles?
6	A	Yes. What I'd have to say is that, once the
7		competitive market has developed, and, for the small
8		customers, there is no sign that that market has
9		developed yet. I believe the restructuring statute
10		also talks about that "restructuring should be
11		implemented in a manner that benefits all consumers
12		equitably and does not benefit one customer class to
13		the detriment of another." To the extent that one
14		customer class can take advantage of competitive
15		options and the other can't, I don't think that it's
16		proper to allow the one class to cost shift.
17	Q	But it's fair to say that a consideration that the
18		Commission must weigh is not creating rules that
19		would cause people to stay on Default Service?
20	A	The Commission has to weigh that, correct, as well as
21		the risk of restructuring in such a way that one
22		customer class can shift costs to another.
23	Q	Do you have any information that would indicate that
24		at this point gaming, either the way you've described

1		it or the way Mr. Hall has described it, is actually
2		occurring?
3	А	I have no understanding that, to this point in time,
4		that anything has occurred. But, even the Commission
5		notes when it, in effect, defined "gaming", that
6		other jurisdictions have addressed this issue in
7		similar circumstances. And, I believe it's been
8		addressed, whether you want to look at KeySpan in New
9		Hampshire, Northern Utilities in New Hampshire,
10		Unitil in New Hampshire, Grid in New Hampshire, CL&P
11		in Connecticut, I think UI in Connecticut has a
12		similar thing as CL&P, or the way Massachusetts
13		WMECO has addressed it.
14	Q	Well, I'm not familiar with all of the examples you
15		cited. I'm familiar with some of them. But, in
16		those cases, how many of those do the utilities own
17		their own generation or supply assets, as opposed to
18		procuring them in the marketplace?
19	A	And, I suppose I can say that KeySpan and Northern
20		Utilities own their own supplemental facilities,
21		which are included in their determination of the cost
22		of gas. So, to a small extent, there is. But I will
23		grant you that the PSNH situation is significantly
24		different because of their ownership of generation.

1And, we have to recognize that when we set up rules.2Q3referred to, those are a very small portion of the4total supply portfolio?5A6QQLet me give you an example of a situation that might7occur and ask you how that would play out with your8proposal. Suppose a customer went into the9marketplace and signed a six-month contract with a10supplier. And, at the end of that contract, so I'm11referring to a mere expiration of the contract in12accordance with its terms, the customer either could13not find a competitive supplier that met its needs or14simply decided that it wasn't satisfied with its15experience in the marketplace, and that might be for16price reasons, it might be for other reasons. At17that point, that customer would be able to come back18to PSNH under your proposal, correct?19A20Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the21contract by a competitive supplier, after the22Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended23anti-gaming rules?		-	
referred to, those are a very small portion of the total supply portfolio? A That's correct. Q Let me give you an example of a situation that might occur and ask you how that would play out with your proposal. Suppose a customer went into the marketplace and signed a six-month contract with a supplier. And, at the end of that contract, so I'm referring to a mere expiration of the contract in accordance with its terms, the customer either could not find a competitive supplier that met its needs or simply decided that it wasn't satisfied with its experience in the marketplace, and that might be for price reasons, it might be for other reasons. At that point, that customer would be able to come back to PSNH under your proposal, correct? A Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month contract by a competitive supplier, after the Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended anti-gaming rules?	1		And, we have to recognize that when we set up rules.
<ul> <li>4 total supply portfolio?</li> <li>5 A That's correct.</li> <li>6 Q Let me give you an example of a situation that might occur and ask you how that would play out with your proposal. Suppose a customer went into the</li> <li>9 marketplace and signed a six-month contract with a</li> <li>10 supplier. And, at the end of that contract, so I'm referring to a mere expiration of the contract in</li> <li>11 accordance with its terms, the customer either could not find a competitive supplier that met its needs or simply decided that it wasn't satisfied with its</li> <li>15 experience in the marketplace, and that might be for price reasons, it might be for other reasons. At that point, that customer would be able to come back to PSNH under your proposal, correct?</li> <li>19 A Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month contract by a competitive supplier, after the Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended anti-gaming rules?</li> </ul>	2	Q	Okay. And, the supplemental supply facilities you
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18 to PSNH under your proposal, correct? 19 A Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the 20 hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month 21 contract by a competitive supplier, after the 22 Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended 23 anti-gaming rules?	16		price reasons, it might be for other reasons. At
19 A Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month contract by a competitive supplier, after the Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended anti-gaming rules?	17		that point, that customer would be able to come back
20 hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month 21 contract by a competitive supplier, after the 22 Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended 23 anti-gaming rules?	18		to PSNH under your proposal, correct?
21 contract by a competitive supplier, after the 22 Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended 23 anti-gaming rules?	19	А	Yes. And, just so I understand the start of the
22 Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended 23 anti-gaming rules?	20		hypothetical, this customer chose a six-month
23 anti-gaming rules?	21		contract by a competitive supplier, after the
	22		Commission, let's say, adopted the OCA's recommended
	23		anti-gaming rules?
24 Q Correct.	24	Q	Correct.

		[Witness: Traum]
1	A	Okay. Thank you. Yes.
2	Q	So, my description there is correct. The next thing
3		that would happen is they could come back to PSNH for
4		energy supply?
5	A	Correct.
6	Q	But, even though that customer's contract had merely
7		expired in accordance with its terms, it then could
8		not, it would be prohibited from going back to the
9		competitive supply market, regardless of what
10		happened to prices, PSNH's price or market prices in
11		that next year? They would have given up that right?
12	A	That's correct. And, the rationale is that the
13		reason we assume that the reason that that
14		customer went to a competitive supply for the
15		six-month period is because they got a better price
16		than PSNH's average rate during that six-month
17		period. Remember, when you set an average rate for a
18		year, there are months where it costs PSNH more and
19		months where it costs PSNH less to provide that
20		service. We'd have to assume that, during the six
21		months this customer went to a competitive supply, it
22		was because the market price was below PSNH's price.
23		So, what they're doing is they're avoiding making
24		PSNH and other customers whole for the higher cost

1		months when they were receiving PSNH's Energy
2		Service.
3	Q	Well, your answer there though assumes that the
4		relationship of prices that you just postulated
5		exists. That the relationship could, in fact, be
6		different, correct? They could be reversed. We
7		don't know exactly what the circumstances are or what
8		the customer was thinking when it made the change?
9	А	If the customer voluntarily chooses a competitive
10		supplier who's offering a rate higher than Public
11		Service, I would be shocked.
12	Q	No, but they might be anticipating what the rate is
13		going to be, am I correct? They may not know what
14		the rate is going to be when they make the choice?
15	A	They won't know what PSNH's rate is going to be?
16	Q	That's correct. Because they're projecting forward
17		for the future period, and there may be either a
18		planned adjustment, for example, they may make a
19		choice in October or November into the next year, or
20		there may be an unplanned adjustment, because PSNH
21		submits a quarterly update.
22	A	What they would know is that come sometime in
23		December, I assume, the Commission will be setting an
24		Energy Service rate for PSNH that is, in theory, for

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1		12 months. And, then, in September or October, PSNH
2		will be making a filing that will be giving them an
3		estimate of what the rate will be for the following
4		12 months. So, they would have that kind of
5		information on hand.
6	Q	I want to ask you a few questions about your
7		testimony. If you'll look at, I'm just going to give
8		you a reference point, if you look at Page 4, you ask
9		yourself a question: "What's the basis for your
10		opinion?" And, you say that you "presume that
11		electric customers with competitive supply options
12		will act in a rational fashion and take advantage of
13		an opportunity to reduce costs once such an
14		opportunity is spotted." Would you agree that the
15		suppliers who serve the New Hampshire market are
16		quite sophisticated and knowledgable about PSNH's
17		Energy Service rates?
18	А	I would certainly assume such.
19	Q	And, do you believe that they're actively marketing
20		customers and potential customers now?
21	A	As far as I know, they are for large customers.
22	Q	Okay. And, again, wouldn't you think that those
23		suppliers would be providing information to the
24		customers, in terms of opportunities to switch back

1		and forth?
2	А	Exactly, as Mr. Hall had referred to, we don't know
3		what the specific information is or arrangements or
4		contracts are that competitive suppliers have with
5		their clients or prospective clients.
6	Q	But, to date, you haven't seen any indication that
7		this switching back and forth has occurred?
8	A	Well, I think we've heard that there were over 130 or
9		so large customers that had switched during 2006, and
10		PSNH is planning as though they're all back on as of
11		the first of the year.
12	Q	Well, we haven't seen that occur yet, have we?
13	А	No, we have not seen it occur yet. I'm just saying
14		what PSNH is planning for.
15	Q	So, what you're concerned about isn't switching back
16		and forth, it's simply migration as a general matter?
17	А	What I'm concerned about is cost shifting to small
18		customers.
19	Q	That comes from migration to the competitive market
20		or back from the competitive market?
21	А	Correct.
22	Q	Do you think that when the Legislature restructured
23		the electric industry, it was doing so in the hope
24		and expectation that customers actually would move to

	the competitive market? Was that part of the thought
	process, to your knowledge?
А	Oh, I was certainly involved more deeply than I
	wanted in that whole process. And, yes, the
	expectation and the hope was that, within a short
	period of time, there would have been competitive
	markets developed for all customer classes, and all
	customers would be able to take advantage of such and
	see reduced bills. Unfortunately, that has not come
	to pass for the vast majority of customers.
Q	My last question on your testimony itself is at the
	bottom of Page 4 you give an example with some actual
	numbers. That's just a hypothetical, right?
A	That's correct.
Q	And, you're not aware of any example where that type
	of thing has occurred, whatever the numbers?
A	That's correct. What I I can certainly, when I
	look at PSNH's Exhibit 2, where they they actually
	estimate what the monthly costs that PSNH will incur
	to provide energy service. And, those rates, on an
	average basis per month, vary by up to I believe
	about a cent and a half a kilowatt-hour. And, then,
	if I look at what their IPP market value table for
	what the cost shifts are there on a monthly basis, or
	Q A Q

	I guess that would be for the marginal cost, they
	vary by up to two and a half cents a kilowatt-hour.
	So, whereas my number is a hypothetical, I probably
	could have used their numbers as an example.
Q	Right. What I meant is, not the dollar figures, but
	you haven't seen any customers who have performed the
	kind of behavior that you're postulating here, that's
	really what I'm asking?
A	I am not aware of an individual customer I could
	point to that do that. But I would just refer to
	what PSNH has said about they have seen 135 or
	whatever customers migrating, and they're
	anticipating them all coming back for January 1, and
	January and February are the highest cost months.
Q	Just want to go through a couple of possible other
	resolutions of the problem that you assert, and I
	think to some extent you've actually touched on these
	in your testimony. Is it fair to say that one way
	you could solve the problem that the Consumer
	Advocate is concerned about is by having monthly
	pricing, so that, when customers came or left, they
	would be paying the true cost to serve in that month,
	as opposed to an average annual price?
A	Yes. And, that was what I had referred to in my
	Q

	testimony as a "second option". That customers, with
	competitive supply options, could be billed a monthly
	rate, based on PSNH's estimated costs for the month.
Q	And, if that could be done, that's a resolution that
	would be acceptable to the Consumer Advocate?
А	That's correct.
Q	And, another possible solution would be breaking down
	the Energy Service rate by class, so that each class
	of customers had the actual cost to serve them
	allocated to them?
А	And, I believe that would have been something similar
	to the third option I listed in my testimony. But I
	recognize that there would be a lot more work, let's
	say, to be done before we could do a split of PSNH's
	generation among the different classes.
Q	Would you agree that those two solutions are ones
	that would be consistent with other regulatory
	principles and would not do any harm to the
	competitive market?
A	I'd say that, if I felt differently, I probably
	wouldn't have put them here as options.
Q	And, the problem with having the Commission adopt
	those options today, instead of yours, is it's
	those are more implicated, and it would take some
	A Q Q A

[Witness:	Traum]
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1		time to really develop those more thoroughly?
2	А	Option 3, yes. Option 2, no, I don't think so. I
3		think that, with Option 2, they have the monthly
4		numbers today incorporated in RAB-2, Pages 1 and 2,
5		of the updated Exhibit 2.
6	Q	Are you suggesting there that that actually could be
7		adopted based on the numbers that are in this filing,
8		is that what you're saying?
9	A	Yes, I am.
10	Q	But you're aware that, and see if we can anticipate
11		the next round of questioning here, that PSNH feels
12		that there are underlying issues with those numbers,
13		that you can't simply implement those numbers as
14		filed?
15	A	I certainly heard the issues about, you know, how do
16		you recognize outages, planned or unplanned? Did you
17		just account for the costs in that specific month or
18		how do you do that? And, I appreciate those concerns
19		that PSNH has raised. And, that's why Option 2 was
20		not our that was part of the reason Option 2 was
21		not the OCA's recommended option. But it is a
22		potential resolution.
23		MR. CAMERINO: Okay. Thank you. That
24	comp	pletes my examination.

		[Witness: Traum]
1		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Ms. Amidon.
2		MS. AMIDON: Thank you. Good morning.
3		THE WITNESS: Good morning.
4	BY MS.	AMIDON:
5	Q	Taking into consideration Mr. Hall's testimony and
6		your testimony, Mr. Hall focusses on actions of a
7		supplier, while you focus on actions of a customer.
8		Considering that we have no evidence that gaming has
9		occurred or the cost shifting that you referred to,
10		how exactly would your proposal help the Commission
11		know which approach is the better of the two or how
12		would you provide the Commission with guidance to
13		choose either approach?
14	A	So, I'm I guess, so I'm clear on your question,
15		when you say "either approach", do you mean my
16		recommended option, as opposed to my option
17	Q	I'm sorry to interrupt. No, Mr. Hall focusses on
18		what he perceives to be the issue, which is gaming by
19		suppliers, and he cites that, out of 135 cases where
20		customers left to a competitive supply, only four
21		have gone back to take a competitive energy supply.
22		So, he's looking at the supplier using PSNH as a
23		hedge for high market costs. You're looking at the
24		customer. And, given the testimony that there's been

1	no evidence of any gaming or cost shifting, how can
2	you provide any assistance to the Commission to
3	determine which approach is appropriate?
4	A I think there is evidence of cost shifting in 2006.
5	There was 135 customers that shifted. They shifted
6	because the market prices were below PSNH's price.
7	And, they weren't paying they were paying rates
8	below PSNH's average costs. In those months, when
9	they had taken power from something other than PSNH,
10	they were paying that they were not paying the
11	rate that was picking up the shortfall for the higher
12	cost months that PSNH provided them with power.
13	MS. AMIDON: I'm going to defer to Mr.
14	Mullen at this point.
15	MR. MULLEN: Good morning.
16	THE WITNESS: Good morning, Steve Mr.
17	Mullen.
18	BY MR. MULLEN:
19	Q I think the main point of the question was Mr. Hall
20	is focussing on actions of the supplier, and you're
21	focussing on actions of the customers. Taking those
22	two testimonies into account, how would the
23	Commission know which approach, meaning focussing on
24	the customer or focussing on the supplier, would be

[Witness: Traum]

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1		the right one is the right way to go? And, I
2		understand your discussion about cost shifting. But,
3		in terms of gaming, you say there's evidence of cost
4		shifting, but we don't really have evidence of
5		"gaming", per se?
6	A	We don't know why those 135 customers went to a
7		competitive supplier, other than I would certainly
8		venture to assume that it was because they could get
9		a better price than they would with PSNH.
10	Q	Okay. So, that just leads me back to considering the
11		two testimonies that have a bit of a different focus,
12		one on the supplier and one on the customer. How
13		does the Commission know, without seeing any evidence
14		of gaming or how gaming, you know, has occurred,
15		whether it should focus on actions of the supplier or
16		actions of the customer?
17	A	And, when you say "actions of the customer", do you
18		mean the customer, the small customer or the choosing
19		customer?
20	Q	I mean the choosing customer.
21	А	What the OCA is asking the Commission to do is to be
22		proactive. That, as PSNH has indicated in the data
23		response I have attached to my testimony, they
24		consider the potential for migration to be

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1		significant in 2007, especially after the volatile
2		winter months of January and February are completed.
3		January and February are the most expensive months.
4		If the customer chooses the end of February or March,
5		they will have taken advantage of average pricing,
6		which is below PSNH's cost to serve. Somebody has to
7		pick that differential up. And, that is what I'm
8		concerned about.
9	Q	I understand, and that gets to your whole cost
10		shifting. I'm looking more I understand there's a
11		little bit of a fine line here between cost shifting
12		and gaming. And, where this was about an anti-gaming
13		proposal, I was just trying to discern whether it is
14		whether you had any way of advising the Commission
15		as to whether it should focus on actions of the
16		supplier compared to actions of the customer, in
17		terms of gaming? I'm understanding your cost
18		shifting argument.
19	A	I'm not sure if I'm understanding a distinction of
20		if the Commission simply were to adopt the OCA's
21		proposal, I think it covers both sides of it.
22		MR. MULLEN: Okay. We'll move on.
23	BY MS.	AMIDON:
24	Q	Yes. I still I think we still have questions

1		about whether this cost shifting you talk about,
2		leaving that aside, whether there's any so-called
3		"gaming" going on in the market. There hasn't been
4		any evidence of it. And, what we are in a quandary
5		is how you would provide any help to the Commission
6		to say "we should look at the supplier action" or "we
7		should look at the customer action" in avoiding
8		prospective anti-gaming. Now, are you participating
9		in docket number DE 06-061, which is the
10		investigation into new federal energy standards under
11		the Energy Policy Act of 2005?
12	A	The Office of Consumer Advocate is participating and
13		has put in some limited comments, yes.
14	Q	And, do you know that one of the pieces that the
15		Commission has under consideration right now is Smart
16		Metering, which would include different types of
17		billing methods that or, consideration of adopting
18		a standard which would include different kinds of
19		billing methods, which could avoid the cost shifting
20		that you're referring to?
21	А	And, certainly, as far as I'm aware of, there is no
22		time frame for when anything has to be done.
23	Q	Well, there is actually, under the statute, the
24		Commission has to make a determination about whether

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1		to adopt the standard by August of this year.
2	А	The standard?
3	Q	A standard, regarding has to make a determination
4		about whether to adopt a standard regarding the
5		so-called "Smart Metering" standard in the Energy
6		Policy Act of 2005 by August, I believe it's
7		August 5th of this coming year.
8	A	And, the Commission, I believe, can decide that they
9		don't have to do anything.
10	Q	The Commission can decide that it can't do anything.
11		But, based on the testimony that you provided today,
12		don't you think the Commission might consider whether
13		there is a way to look at that docket also to address
14		this issue?
15	A	Absolutely. But, I think
16	Q	Okay.
17	A	I think that, at this point, if I may finish
18		please, at this point in time, I think we're facing
19		an issue that's much more immediate.
20	Q	Okay. Regarding monthly pricing, is this something
21		that you would propose for all customers of PSNH?
22	А	No, just the customer classes that have the
23		competitive options.
24		MS. AMIDON: Okay. Thank you.

[Witness: Traum]

		[Witness: Traum]
1		THE WITNESS: You're welcome.
2		CHAIRMAN GETZ: Mr. Eaton.
3	BY MR.	EATON:
4	Q	Can I ask how monthly pricing would work? Would the
5		customers be all charged an average rate, but, if
6		they left, you would go back and rebill those
7		customers who left and charge them a monthly rate for
8		the month they were on?
9	А	I believe that's the approach that WMECO has in
10		Massachusetts. That's not what the OCA is
11		recommending. Because I think that going back and
12		recalculating could be viewed by some as an exit fee,
13		and I don't think that would be consistent with New
14		Hampshire legislation. So, we would under Option
15		2, it would simply be a different rate would be
16		billed each month for the classes that face that
17		have competitive alternatives.
18	Q	And, there would be months when PSNH's rates were
19		higher than the market rate?
20	А	That's certainly a possibility.
21	Q	And, customers, who had the option, would move off
22		during those months and come back when PSNH's monthly
23		rate was less than the market rate?
24	A	That would be correct. The assumption is is that

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1		DCNUL coloulated its monthly write to serve all of the
1		PSNH calculates its monthly rate to cover all of the
2	1	costs it incurred in that month, so there would be no
3		potential for shifting costs to other customers.
4	Q	Well, would we but, for the customers who have an
5		option, would we ever recover our cost of scheduled
6		maintenance? If we do it in the shoulder months,
7		when costs are low, and I can show you some data in
8		the filing, but wouldn't we always see those
9		customers leave when PSNH is doing scheduled
10		maintenance and its overall costs are high, but the
11		marginal energy costs of the market is below that?
12	А	Okay. I completely agree with you, and as I already
13		stated, that Option 2 is not the OCA's recommended
14		option, precisely because of that type of a reason.
15	Q	Others may have asked this as well, but when does
16		migration turn into gaming?
17	А	I don't know if there is a specific definition, and I
18		don't know if it matters as long as there's cost
19		shifting.
20		MR. EATON: Thank you. That's all the
21	ques	tions I have.
22		CMSR. BELOW: Yes. Thank you, Mr.
23	Chai	rman.
24	BY CMS	R. BELOW:

1	Q	Mr. Traum, in your description of possible options,
2		Page 7 of Exhibit 4, in the description of the second
3		option, for monthly rates, are you assuming that, in
4		conjunction, that there would be a monthly true-up or
5		perhaps a lagging true-up of over- or underrecovery
6		or not?
7	A	No, that it would just go into the same pool as all
8		other costs and revenues.
9	Q	So, you're suggesting the second option could occur
10		if there was this monthly price based on estimated
11		monthly costs throughout the year, and there could be
12		either a periodic true-up, monthly or annually or
13		whatever?
14	A	It would go The revenues and the related costs
15		would go into the same pool with that of all other
16		customers taking Energy Service. And, any
17		over-/undercollection would then be spread among all
18		customers. I think it would be too complicated to
19		start tracking monthly over-/undercollections for
20		just this particular set of customers. In terms of
21		the as I just stated with Mr. Eaton, that the
22		concern that the OCA has about this option is the
23		outages and how that's taken into account, what that
24		does to the monthly costs.

1	Q	Is it conceivable that you could take the well,
2		let me back up. The concern about scheduled outages,
3		is that sort of a fixed cost, in effect, what we
4		might think of as a rate base cost for the owned
5		assets are continued to be recovered or allocated to
6		the monthly billing, even when there's a scheduled
7		outage, and there's an additional cost from energy
8		purchases to make up for that lost energy?
9	A	Well, yes, and the question is, you know, should
10		those costs be recovered in that month or just in the
11		months when the unit is on line.
12	Q	So, another alternative for the monthly rate could be
13		that you would allocate all costs for the owned
14		generation based on when it was scheduled to produce,
15		so when there is a scheduled outage, you are only
16		buying the the only energy cost would be the
17		marginal cost or incremental cost of getting it from
18		the market, which would result from purchasing energy
19		on the market?
20	A	I believe I agree with what you just said.
21		CMSR. BELOW: Okay. Sorry. That's
22	clos	e enough. Good. Thanks.
23	BY CHA	IRMAN GETZ:
24	Q	Mr. Traum, I wanted to follow up. In your last

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1		exchange with Mr. Eaton, I think you stated that
2		there's well, it's really irrelevant in trying to
3		draw a distinction between what's legitimate
4		migration and what would be illegitimate gaming.
5		And, which I think also goes to the issue of
6		something brought up by Mr. Hall, that you're not
7		concerned so much with intent of or of someone taking
8	Į	advantage of a situation, but it's more an issue of
9		"is there a structural flaw that can be exploited in
10		a way that would impose costs on the larger group of
11		customers?" And, is it fair to say that you're
12		looking at the current situation and saying that
13		you're proposing your Option 1 is a way of guarding
14		against future exploitation of a structural flaw or
15		you're trying to correct a structural flaw? Is that
16		a fair way to characterize your position?
17	A	I think that's a very fair way to characterize it.
18	Q	And, then, if we don't do it now, then there's some
19		likelihood, in the upcoming months, as what you see
20		as this flaw can be exploited to the disadvantage of
21		the greater number of customers?
22	А	That's correct. And, I referred to PSNH's testimony
23		on this, the greater likelihood of migration in 2007
24		after the first couple of months. And, you know,

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1		when we say "flaw" or taking advantage of the system,
2		I wouldn't fault any large customer today from
3		following the rules to their own economic benefit.
4	Q	And, you don't think that the way that PSNH is
5		proposing, Mr. Hall proposed it, is that you would
6		concentrate on, well, the two segments, a six-month
7		basically "stay in" provision, and that they only be
8		prevented from going back out to the same supplier,
9		and you don't think that that's enough protection?
10		You think in both cases it has to extend to all other
11		competitive suppliers and the 12 months?
12	A	Okay. That's certainly the OCA's preference is
13		twelve months, all suppliers. The way PSNH's was
14		written, I think there is even a question of
15		affiliates of a competitive supplier, or two
16		affiliates, can they bounce back and forth, two
17		affiliates or six affiliates.
18		CHAIRMAN GETZ: All right. Redirect,
19	Ms.	Hatfield?
20		MS. HATFIELD: Yes. Thank you.
21		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
22	BY MS.	HATFIELD:
23	Q	Mr. Traum, following up on one of Staff's questions,
24		I think they were getting at how the Commission

	should consider addressing this issue, whether it is
	a supplier who is potentially gaming the system
	versus a customer who is trying to game the system.
	And, is it fair to say that, in the option the
	preferred option that you've suggested in your
	testimony that it doesn't really matter who is trying
	to game the system, but that the proposal that's in
	your testimony would help prevent gaming regardless
	of who's trying to do it?
А	I think that's a fair summary.
Q	And, the other thing, I wanted to ask you about
	Exhibit 3, which was which is the paper that PSNH
	presented today on the forecasted costs to serve the
	two main different classes of customers. I was
	wondering, in the brief time that you've had to look
	at that document, if you had any thoughts on its
	usefulness in this docket or as to how much weight
	the Commission should give to it or other things that
	you think needs to be considered when looking at it?
А	Certainly. The first time I saw this was the same
	time as the Commission saw this document. So, it was
	quite a surprise. I haven't had any opportunity at
	all to really analyze it. So, I don't think the
	Commission should give it much weight at this point
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1	in time. And, I believe, as had been stated, this
2	was looked at before any migration takes place, so
3	that it ignores what's been the real concern in this,
4	is the migration aspect of the costs and what that
5	does to costs.
6	The other thing I'll throw out, and I've
7	thrown out in many instances, and I'm sure the
8	Commission is sick of hearing me say it, is that
9	small customers are paying a higher Stranded Cost
10	Charge than large customers. And, there are many
11	reasons the Commission approved that, but, say, well,
12	maybe one of them is that the load factors differ
13	between classes. And, that's what I think this, in
14	fact, shows, load factor on a monthly basis.
15	MS. HATFIELD: Thank you.
16	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Okay. Then, that's all
17	for the witness. Thank you, Mr. Traum. Are there other
18	witnesses, Ms. Amidon?
19	MS. HATFIELD: No thank you.
20	MS. AMIDON: Excuse me.
21	CHAIRMAN GETZ: You are not proffering a
22	witness today, is that correct?
23	MS. AMIDON: No, that's correct.
24	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Is there any objection
24	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Is there any objection

1	to striking identifications and entering the exhibits as
2	full exhibits?
3	(No verbal response)
4	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Then, they will be
5	entered as full exhibits. Mr. Eaton.
6	MR. EATON: Mr. Chairman, there's a
7	couple of procedural matters that I'd like to address at
8	this time. The first of which is a motion for protective
9	order, which we filed this morning. It concerns a data
10	request that was not entered into the record, but it was
11	filed with the Commission under the new rules, which allow
12	the party to represent that this information is
13	confidential and file a motion for protective order. This
14	is a request that's been asked in previous proceedings and
15	previously we received a protective order. It has to do
16	with the actual dates and duration of our planned
17	scheduled outages. And, that information is provided to
18	ISO-New England, but is kept confidential and not public
19	information. And, it would give a supplier an advantage
20	if they knew exactly those dates, in order to know what
21	times we need supplemental power to replace our base load
22	generation that's doing scheduled maintenance. So, I just
23	bring that up that it was supplied this morning before the
24	hearing, and if the Commission would rule on it in its

1 final order.

2	The second item I want to raise has to
3	do with a discovery dispute that took place, and "dispute"
4	may give it more than it deserves, as far as the
5	controversy. However, PSNH asked questions of
6	Constellation in this proceeding, and we asked questions
7	of Freedom Energy. Freedom Energy responded to our
8	questions and Constellation objected to our questions.
9	The main question we were looking at, for the purposes of
10	studying migration, for the purposes of actually having a
11	the best possible data to calculate an energy rate was
12	to know "How many kilowatt-hours are you planning on
13	serving PSNH customers in 2007? What migration do you see
14	coming to your company, as opposed to PSNH supplying under
15	Energy Service?"
16	Constellation objected on the basis of a
17	decision that the Commission made in the City of Nashua
18	case that an intervenor that doesn't supply testimony is
19	not subject to discovery. And, they also objected on the
20	idea that this information is confidential and that it
21	wasn't relevant to the proceeding. So, rather than have
22	PSNH file a motion to compel and argue those points, which
23	we don't concede, we met together, and the Staff acted as
24	a mediator of those discussions. And, Staff brought out

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1	the point that just getting Constellation's number doesn't
2	give you the whole picture of what's going on in 2007.
3	There are other competitive suppliers who are registered
4	to do business with the Commission in PSNH's territory.
5	So, we have drafted some recommendations
6	that we will finalize, and also ask the OCA to look at as
7	well, that would set up a system where PSNH could request
8	the Commission to ask competitive suppliers to supply an
9	estimate of what they would supply in PSNH's service
10	territory for the year 2008. We'll make that request in
11	mid year 2007. And, have that information supplied to the
12	Staff in confidence, and the Staff would then aggregate
13	the information and supply it to PSNH in confidence. And,
14	we would use it to help make our calculation of the rate a
15	little bit more accurate for the year 2008, because we
16	might have a better idea of how many customers would
17	remain off the system, who were off the system on 2007, or
18	any more that might leave in 2007. So, it wouldn't be
19	customer-specific estimates, but all the information would
20	be aggregated and supplied to PSNH to help us make a
21	better calculation of the rate. So, we will be working on
22	a written recommendation to the Commission and file that
23	at a later point for your consideration.
24	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Any response to either

of these issues from the other parties? 1 I would just note for the MR. CAMERINO: 2 record on the motion of confidential treatment, that's 3 4 similar to something PSNH has filed in other Energy Service dockets, and Constellation does not plan to file 5 6 an objection to that. And, I think Mr. Eaton's 7 description of the discovery dispute and its resolution 8 was correct, and PSNH already has the historical 9 information of what suppliers serve, but what they're 10 seeking is the projected information for the coming year, 11 and that's what's confidential. The historical 12 information is confidential as well, but PSNH doesn't 13 release that publicly. The projected information is 14 confidential as well. And, conceptually, what PSNH is 15 proposing would enable Constellation to ensure that that 16 information remains confidential, but gets to PSNH in a 17 form that is meaningful for them. 18 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Anyone else? 19 MS. AMIDON: Well, Staff doesn't have 20 any objection to the motion for confidential treatment. 21 And, again, I'd agree with Mr. Camerino that Mr. Eaton 22 explained that we did meet to try to resolve that 23 discovery dispute. And, while we haven't worked out the 24 mechanisms, I should say we have agreed on the principles

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1	and on the concept of providing this information to the
2	Commission would probably assist in being able to provide
3	it in the aggregate to PSNH, but it would also provide the
4	Commission with information on the competitive market that
5	it may find useful in other policy decisions.
6	CHAIRMAN GETZ: All right. Is there
7	anything else, before the opportunity for closing
8	statements? Commissioner Below.
9	CMSR. BELOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10	At the start of the hearing this morning, Ms. Amidon made
11	a reference to a letter filed by Mr. Rodier. In our
12	docket description, the only letter we have reference to
13	is his original motion for intervention. I was wondering
14	if she was aware of another letter that has been filed
15	more recently concerning the proceeding today?
16	MS. AMIDON: Yes. I think that Mr.
17	Eaton is giving it to you right now.
18	CMSR. BELOW: Okay.
19	(Atty. Eaton distributing documents.)
20	MS. AMIDON: It's a letter dated
21	November 16th.
22	MR. EATON: That letter I don't believe
23	is signed, but it was scanned into our system, and I
24	brought copies with me today.

1	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Okay. Well, we will
2	wait to see if an official copy makes its way into the
3	docket book. Is there anything else before closing
4	statements then?
5	(No verbal response)
6	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Mr. Camerino.
7	MR. CAMERINO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
8	The Consumer Advocate has expressed their concern in the
9	docket about migration, and that is what they're concerned
10	about, migration, not just gaming. And, they, at this
11	point, haven't provided any evidence that gaming of a sort
12	that the Commission ought to be concerned about is going
13	on. I don't think that the Commission should be taking
14	action in response to migration, which was the whole
15	purpose, after all, of restructuring the market, was to
16	get customers to move into the competitive supply market.
17	And, if we have an active, vibrant competitive market,
18	that costs will go down. If the competitive market is
19	stillborn, we're not going to see a reduction in costs.
20	So, the basic purpose, even as the OCA says, of trying to
21	reduce costs through a competitive market, won't be
22	achieved. You will never get a chance to get there if you
23	stifle migration just as it's getting started.
24	Up to now we have seen very limited

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1	migration. 2006 is the first year, as Mr. Hall indicated,
2	that there has really been a significant shift, and even
3	that is fairly limited. Ironically, during that year,
4	we've had a significant overrecovery of costs, not a cost
5	shifting, but a significant overrecovery. And, I don't
6	want to make the argument here, and I'm not making the
7	argument that the overrecovery is somehow entirely due to
8	the fact that we had migration, but it is a complex issue.
9	And, only a couple of years ago this Commission created a
10	credit mechanism to try to entice customers to go into the
11	competitive market, so that PSNH could reduce their
12	supplemental market purchases necessary to serve their
13	entire load. Now we're talking about putting in place a
14	policy that would make it more difficult to shift off.
15	So, there are competing interests here,
16	and it's a complicated matter, and where there's no
17	evidence of a problem. I think it's a mistake to add
18	precipitously. I would argue that what has occurred this
19	year is a success story, and we ought to be applauding
20	that and trying to encourage more of it, not immediately
21	having a knee-jerk reaction to try to stem that flow.
22	As was indicated during the testimony,
23	and as the Commission is painfully aware, that the
24	restructuring statute has a lot of principles. And,

anybody could pick any one of them to try to support their argument. The point is to balance all of those very carefully. And, I think right now, at the very moment 3 that the competitive market is getting started, would be 5 the wrong time to put in place a policy that might slow 6 that progress.

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7 With that said, if the Commission were to adopt a anti-gaming policy, and Constellation strongly 8 requests that the Commission not do that at this time, it 9 10 would prefer the proposal that PSNH has submitted in its 11 testimony. I want to stress that not even PSNH is supporting that proposal. They're just saying, "if you're 12 13 going to do something, that's what you ought to do." But I don't think that a policy of this sort has been fleshed 14 15 out enough. Certainly, one thing that Constellation is 16 concerned about is there are circumstances, like 17 administrative errors, either by the utility or the 18 company or by the supplier, where somebody is incorrectly 19 knocked off of their supplier service. There may be other 20 types of minor, but important, technicalities that need to 21 be addressed if you implement a policy. 22 I also would suggest that there are 23 other options for addressing the concern that the Consumer

Advocate has. We explored a couple of those on

1	cross-examination of Mr. Traum, and he discussed them in
2	his testimony. I understand that those approaches are
3	complicated, they would take a lot more work. PSNH
4	doesn't necessarily support them. But this Commission is
5	very used to dealing with complicated issues, especially
6	with regard to the competitive market, doing cost
7	allocation studies and things like that, to get it right,
8	rather than putting a quick Band-Aid that creates a
9	problem where none exists. And, so, we would encourage
10	the Commission, at most, to study this further, but not
11	take any action at this time. Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Thank you. Ms.
13	Hatfield.
14	MS. HATFIELD: Thank you. The OCA
15	agrees with much of what Mr. Camerino has said about the
16	complexity of the issue and the balancing that the
17	Commission must undertake. And, we do support rules and
18	policies consistent with our current statutes on
19	restructuring, that encourage the development of a
20	competitive market, which includes migration for those
21	customers who can choose. But we believe that rules need
22	to be in place to ensure that the development of the
23	competitive market does not shift any costs to those
24	customers who are not able to participate. And, we agree

with the Chairman's description of this issue, that we're 1 trying to address a structural flaw, that we think the 2 Commission does need to be proactive in order to ensure 3 that non-choosing customers do not have to subsidize any 4 costs related to migration. 5 We also think that, regardless of 6 7 whether gaming was taking place as a result of a customer's activity or something that was being done by 8 suppliers is not very relevant, and that the option that 9 we have proposed, that would be the first option in Mr. 10 Traum's testimony that would create a 12-month requirement 11 of staying on Energy Service, would prevent gaming 12 13 regardless of who was trying to game the system. And, so, 14 as a result, we would request that the Commission be proactive and prevent that type of activity from 15 16 occurring. 17 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Ms. Amidon. 18 MS. AMIDON: Thank you. Staff has 19 reviewed the rate mechanisms and calculations and we 20 support the Energy Service rate that PSNH developed and filed in its November 17th filing. With respect to the 21 22 issue of gaming, Staff is concerned that there is no evidence of gaming, and we don't know if this has been 23 said before, but there are unintended consequences to 24

imposing the OCA's 12-month restriction. It could have the effect we're concerned of hindering competition, and competition, as we know, is not very robust in this state at this point. We think it reflects some of the comments that Attorney Camerino made, and, insofar as that goes, I think we agree with him.

7 However, we also think that perhaps the Commission would benefit from receiving quarterly reports 8 9 from PSNH on what migration that they're seeing, what 10 customers -- what customers they're seeing move from PSNH 11 to a competitive supplier, how many megawatts that represents, so that the Commission can have information 12 13 from both sides. First, with what we propose in response 14 to PSNH's data requests from Constellation. And, then, 15 secondly, the Commission, in this order in this case, 16 could require PSNH to make those reports on a quarterly 17 basis to the Commission to get more complete information 18 on migration.

And, I would suggest that, in the upcoming dockets with Unitil and with Grid, the Commission could also request that such information be made available on a regular basis, so that we probably will have a better idea of whether there is something like gaming or strategic moving of customers going on. Absent that kind

1	of information, we're reluctant to even recommend PSNH's
2	six-month alternative to address a problem which
3	apparently there's no evidence it exists.
4	And, finally, as I suggested in my
5	questioning of Mr. Traum, there is another docket, the
6	docket investigating the federal standards in the Energy
7	Policy Act of 2005, where the Commission has to take
8	action by August 5th, 2007 regarding metering. And, there
9	are ways in that docket to address kind of to address
10	the costs to make sure that customers are paying the
11	actual costs of their service that could avoid, and this
12	is leaving gaming aside, it could avoid the cost shifting
13	that the OCA is concerned about for those non-changing
14	customers.
15	So, having said that, we, you know, we
16	urge you to take great caution in fashioning anything that
17	might impede competition, and suggest that perhaps the
18	Commission needs more information from both the utilities
19	and the competitive energy suppliers in order to make a
20	really well-informed decision about what corrections to
21	make to any structure flaw. Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN GETZ: Thank you. Mr. Eaton.
23	MR. EATON: Mr. Chairman, first of all,
24	we request that the Commission approve the proposed rate

1	of 8.59 cents per kilowatt-hour. And, with respect to the
2	issue of gaming, we agree that we ought to wait and see.
3	There's been some evidence presented in this proceeding
4	about what's happened in 2006. But I think the reporting
5	ought to start with 2006. Let's have it This is the
6	first year where actually we've had significant migration.
7	And, I think the way of tracking it is not from January
8	1st, 2007 forward, but let's see how many customers did
9	move this year and see what those customers do next year
10	as well. So, we'd be very glad to report on a quarterly
11	basis about migration of customers.
12	The idea of cost shifting is not not
13	well documented, as far as I'm concerned. As Mr. Camerino
14	pointed out, at some point we wanted customers off the
15	system, because they could take nine cent power that we
16	bought on the market off of our system. And, quite
17	simplistically, if we could take that 30 percent that we
18	buy off system and reduce it to 10 percent, our costs
19	would go down for the customers who remain. But that's
20	oversimplifying the matter, too, because those customers
21	could come back on whenever they wanted and could also
22	never contribute to the fixed costs of generation and
23	maintenance on those generators. So, it's still unclear
24	as to what happens when a customer leaves, whether they

take high costs off of our system or whether they impose 1 costs on other -- higher costs on other customers. 2 3 No matter what -- if you decide to choose an anti-gaming proposal, I think you ought to make 4 5 the initial decision as to whether it applies prospectively. There are customers who have left the 6 7 system. And, if -- they don't know that the rules might 8 be changing as of December of 2006. So that, by coming back on the PSNH system, they're there for a year, if you 9 10 adopt the OCA's position, or that they cannot return to 11 their current supplier for six months, if you adopt the 12 PSNH proposal. So, I think we ought to have these rules, 13 if you decide to adopt the proposal, that they ought to 14 apply prospectively to customers who make that decision to 15 leave in 2007, and not the ones who already have, when the 16 anti-gaming proposals were not even fleshed out when they 17 made their decision. 18 That's all I have. Thank you. 19 CHAIRMAN GETZ: Okay. Then, we will 20 close this hearing and take the matter under advisement. 21 Thank you. 22 (Hearing ended at 11:43 a.m.) 23 24